New revelations in the case of Xinjiang
A re-leaking of documents containing policies and speeches on Xinjiang reveal top CCP leadership’s involvement in what’s happening in the region.
Sorry for the lack of newsletters recently. I was sick. My in-laws visited. I have a baby. There’s a lot going on. Here’s a long one to make up for it.
Earlier this month, it was revealed that a set of documents was leaked to an organisation called the Uyghur Tribunal that provides insights into government and CCP security policies in Xinjiang. This newsletter will essentially act as a summary of a summary of said document, which is now available to the public here, as well as a host of other documents which together give us a deeper understanding of the CCP’s long-term strategy for the region.
This drop is quite interesting as, since the New York Times reveals, we haven’t really had any concrete updates on what’s been going on in Xinjiang. Though Vice and BBC reporting has revealed some of the goings on, and some Uyghurs have come out themselves to report on their own experiences or about missing family members, it’s been more than difficult to get an understanding of what exactly the CCP is trying to achieve.
What exactly was leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal? According to the Introduction:
“The “Xinjiang Papers” are a cache of government documents from the People’s Republic of China (PRC), most of them classified, that were originally leaked to the New York Times by a “member of the Chinese political establishment” and published on November 16, 2019... In September 2021, a set of digital files was leaked to the Uyghur Tribunal based in London during their second set of hearings (September 10th to 13th), by a person who wishes to remain anonymous. Nothing further is known about the origin of these files...In total, the leak contains 11 unique documents and 300 unique pages.”
Transcripts of the documents are available in Chinese here, though only numbers 1, 2, and 4 have been authenticated so far. For this reason, they’re the only ones I’ve used in this newsletter, and I will reference them where appropriate (and juicy). Though they’re plagued by boring CCP bureaucracy-speak, and dated from 2014 and 2017, these documents do give us a glimpse into the minds of Beijing and Xinjiang’s top officials as to how they formulate long-term policy in Xinjiang and for what purposes.
The leak
The documents were originally provided to The Uyghur Tribunal, an independent people’s tribunal established in 2020 with the purpose of investigating “ongoing atrocities and possible Genocide’ against the Uyghur, Kazakh and other Turkic Muslim populations” living in China. Being a people’s tribunal, it has no backing from any state or international organisation, though such bodies can often pressure states to take human rights violations more seriously, and provide some counsel for victims and their families. The tribunal then engaged Adrian Zenz to interpret the documents and give his analysis and key findings. Zenz is a German anthropologist who is currently senior China Studies fellow at anti-communist think tank Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, and has written extensively on the topic of the Uyghurs and Xinjiang.
There were four different types of document leaked:
Internal speeches by Xi Jinping
Internal speeches by other officials (e.g. Xinjiang’s Party Secretary Chen Quanguo and his second in command, Zhu Hailun)
Directives and reports on the surveillance and control of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang
Internal investigations into local officials
According to the report, “[w]ith few exceptions, the Xinjiang Papers consist of documents classified at the highest and second highest classification levels.” Methods for authenticating the documents can be found in section 3 of the summary report.
The author of the document does interpret what is written, for example with phrases like “this demonstrates how the central government itself is behind the intention to reengineer Xinjiang’s ethnic cultures and communities.” From my own perspective, I feel obliged to point out that on their own, what little we’ve seen of these documents does not seem to provide any definitive evidence of what a lot of people are calling ‘cultural genocide’ in Xinjiang. However, I think that this information should be considered along with other events happening in the region and other evidence that’s come to light, which we’ve discussed in previous newsletters. You can also browse the Tribunal’s website to see other things they’ve uncovered about the treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. I will leave it to the reader to determine the true significance of the statements made by the CCP’s senior leadership on the matter.
The contents
Information in the document is divided into six main sections:
Internment camps
Birth control
Forced labour transfer
Surveillance
Education
Ethnic and religious affairs
The evidence from the documents highlights either specific policies, directives, or general suggestions about actions Xinjiang cadres and government officials should take in each of these areas. The main summary document states that the main goal of these policies is to secure the region, thus demonstrating that China is a safe country to do business with, especially in light of the Belt and Road Initiative. It states that the CCP’s overall goal is not only to reduce or ‘water down’ the Uyghur population, but also to better integrate the Turkic Muslim population into Chinese society, reducing the importance of religion and increasing the importance of the Party in the lives of the people.
I want to cover the most revealing and important aspects of the documents, but it may be worth giving them a read yourself if you have time (and in some cases, if you can read Chinese).
Internment camps
Known in Chinese as Vocational Education and Training Transformation Centres (职业教育培训转化中心), the documents show that the primary purpose of these camps is the ‘de-extremification’ and ‘transformation through education’ of those deemed to be religious extremists. (At one point there is mention of a ‘prison training centre [监所培训中心] but I’m not sure if this is referring to the same thing). These camps form a key part of the government’s anti-terrorism campaign, preemptively identifying possible problem groups for detainment and forcing them into transformation centres for patriotic education and skills training that they can use in their work once they leave the centre (see section 3).
In his list of 9 key points for implementing Xi’s strategy, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo specifically refers to managing the vocational training centres as crucial to the general goals of regional policy, and also mentions something called the ‘five preventions’ (五防) that should be carried out in these centres (don’t ask me what the five preventions are, I can’t seem to find out).
In Xi’s speech given while inspecting Xinjiang, while he doesn’t appear to refer to the training camps, he does talk about the problem of terrorists, their reeducation in prisons, and their ability to spread their ‘poison’ throughout society. He refers to them in the language of disease, stating that if they are left untreated they risk cross-infecting (交叉感染) others. However, I don’t think these prisons should be seen as too separate from the vocational training centres, as what is considered a ‘crime’ is left deliberately vague and up to local officials to determine. Besides, all these people appear to be detained against their will. This could be why we often see reports of people who have been imprisoned without committing any crime nor for breaking rules surrounding the promulgation of religion. Their problem isn’t their deeds, but rather their thoughts:
“Although some people, after being affected by the infiltration of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts, have yet to carry out violent terrorist activities themselves, they have already been infected with the “virus” of religious extremism and violent terrorist thoughts and could act at any moment, endangering themselves and those around them. They must be sent to transformation through education classes to receive “hospitalized treatment” to eliminate the harm of the “virus” and restore their mental health.”
He also notes that even once they have been released from detention centres, these people must still be educated and the transformation work should also continue to avoid the ‘tigers returning to the mountains’ (就是将来这些人放出来也要继续教育转化,放出来以后不是放虎归山). It is also hinted that the detention centres are meant to run indefinitely (要把职业教育培训中心坚定不移长期办下去 - from an unauthenticated document).
Birth Control
One of the accusations made in the summary report is that drastically reducing the number of births among the Uyghur population is a key part of the CCP’s plan to commit cultural genocide in the region. The main evidence the analyst provides is part of Xi’s 2014 speech where he states that “family planning laws should be made equal for all ethnic groups” (在南疆实行各民族平等的计划生育政策). This would overturn previous loopholes in the One Child policy that allowed ethnic minorities to have more than one child, especially if they lived in rural areas or had a girl first.
He also adds that religion should not be allowed to interfere with family planning or marriage laws (决不允许任何人利用宗教干预行政、。。。婚姻,计划生育). Other unavailable documents also contain statements by top officials that the population of southern Xinjiang especially is ‘unbalanced’, comprised of only 15% Han people, and mandating that “by 2022, at least 300,000 settlers (mostly Han from eastern China) are to be moved to regions in southern Xinjiang.”
While there don’t seem to be any statements that directly call for the population of Uyghurs to be reduced, this assertion is corroborated by other reports that find that “the birth-rate across the region fell by nearly half (48.74 percent) in the two years between 2017 and 2019.” The Chinese government does provide a counter narrative, however, giving other reasons for the decline in birth rate in the region that paint a picture that the Uyghurs have more autonomy than other reports suggest. However, there is a clear and open policy to integrate more Han Chinese into Xinjiang, and there have been several attempts by the CCP (or related bodies) to encourage Han-Uyghur intermarriage.
Labour transfer
One article I read suggested that many young Uyghur women feel forced to marry Han ‘comrades’ (ones that are sent into family homes to promote unity and make sure no illegal activities are going on which is totally normal and not at all creepy) because of the lack of Uyghur men in society. One reason for the reduction in young Uyghur men could, of course, be attributed to the forced labour transfer of detainees once they leave reeducation camps.
A policy goal was introduced in 2014 that aimed to place “at least 1 million workers into jobs in textile and garment industries by 2023, with 650,000 of them coming from the southern Uyghur majority regions.” We’ve covered this topic a little in a previous newsletter, back when the discussion about products made using cotton produced in Xinjiang was heating up.
Of course, the party mainly portrays this transfer as being for the Uyghurs’ own good - it not only allows them to earn better incomes, but keeps them out of trouble and helps them to better integrate into Chinese society. Unemployment (by official government standards) is a huge problem in Xinjiang, as is lack of education and skilled workforce according to Premier Li Keqiang. According to Li, the Uyghurs have to “transform their way of thinking about employment” [转变就业观念], presumably by overcoming their penchant for wanting to stay in their hometowns and participate in traditional jobs, and instead adapt to being migrant workers with no rights like the rest of the working class Chinese population.
Surveillance
The summary document suggests that the primary purpose of surveillance measures in Xinjiang is to enact preemptive policing by creating “early warning mechanisms” (预警机制) to stamp out terrorism and send possible victims of extremism to reeducation camps when need be.
The surveillance system relies on both police, local cadres, local informants, and technology such as apps installed on phones to track people and security systems that collect and collate data on individuals. This is obviously supported by the policy of sending cadres into people’s homes to become members of their family (see links in section 3).
Education
In his 2014 speech, Xi Jinping expresses concern that not enough Uyghur youths are able to enter the workforce at a high level, and also lack the skills and education to get good jobs. He fears that there is a wall between these youths and society that causes them to become isolated, and thus fall prey to religious extremism. Therefore the point of educational policies in the region is not just to create a better, more integrated workforce, but also to reduce a reliance on religion and, thus, terrorism. Chen Quanguo points out that ideological conformity is one of the top priorities in stabilising the region, both between the Uyghurs and the rest of the population, and among those carrying out the party’s policies in Xinjiang.
Xi’s first priority in his 2014 speech is to expand the boarding school system in the province. He states that:
“The establishment of correct values must start with the baby. Education in Xinjiang, from preschool education to university education, must first cultivate people who love the party, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation. The schools at all levels and types in Xinjiang emphasize moral education first and foster morality.” (pg 20)
Ethnic and religious affairs
It seems that in general, the Party is playing the long game when it comes to dominating the Uyghurs and Xinjiang more generally. In a quote from the second document he says:
“In human history, some ethnic groups have gradually disappeared. For example, the Huns, Rouran, Khitan, Dangxiang and other races no longer exist today. However, this is the result of a long process of social development, and it is by no means possible to imagine such a thing artificially. If you imagine this, you will make a huge political mistake.”
This quote is quite chilling, as it suggests that the Party is happy to wait for the last of the Uyghurs to die out, and seems confident that will be the case while the Han, presumably, continue their reign. When combined with all the other policies - reeducation, intermarriage, boarding schools, labour relocation - it seems clear that the CCP is happy to play a waiting game. As with most policy in China, the treatment of the Uyghurs is based on a historical determinism wholeheartedly embraced by the party - the CCP was meant to rule China, only the Party can lead China on its true course, and it will do so indefinitely.
The conclusions(?)
Alongside the leaked documents, the Uyghur Tribunal also released a judgement against the PRC as to whether or not it had committed “genocide, crimes against humanity and torture against Uyghur, Kazakh and other ethnic minority citizens in the north west region of China known as Xinjiang.”
But what impact will this judgement have? It is possible that we are already starting to see the beginning of a coordinated backlash against China. The UK, US, and Canada are refusing to send top officials to the Winter Olympics in Beijing; the US recently passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act; we’ve already discussed the new AUKUS pact between Australia, the UK, and the US at great length; and in general the movement has been strengthened by prominent individuals willing to lend their voice to the cause.
The world seems to want to take a tough stance on China and support the Uyghurs, but unfortunately many international goals are not achievable without its cooperation, such as those relating to climate change and fighting the spread of disease. The UN has responded to the report, stating that it is ‘deeply disturbing’, though they didn’t pass any judgement on the conclusions of genocide through population control. If they’re waiting for China to meet them halfway, they’ll be waiting a long time. China will never admit to any crimes, and will continue to accuse everyone of lying:
For all their nonchalance and dismissive hand-waving, China is still hyper vigilant about Xinjiang. In his 2017 speech, Chen Quanguo states that “the situation in Xinjiang is still grim. We must keep the alarm bells ringing. We must not forget the dangers, not forget the chaos, never give the hostile forces a respite, never give violent terrorists a chance to make a comeback, and never give in to violent terror.” From the CCP’s perspective, any policies enacted in Xinjiang are completely necessary for social, economic, and political stability. This is besides the fact that the CCP believes wholeheartedly in its own policies, and believes that they’re working exactly as intended.
The most likely thing that will happen is a further crackdown on foreigners in the region, and a thorough investigation of all CCP and government staff working in Xinjiang. We can say goodbye to any reporters scouring the region (at least without a chaperone) and any report we do get will likely be more of the same. For now, we will have to rely on the trickle of tragic stories from those who manage to escape. And that will have to be good enough.
This newsletter will be taking a break over the next few weeks for Christmas and New Years. Hope you all have a happy holiday period!
Sources
Adrian Zenz, The Xinjiang Papers: An Introduction
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Family De-planning: The Coercive Campaign to Drive Down Indigenous Birth-rates in Xinjiang
China Daily, An Analysis Report on Population Change in Xinjiang
China Daily, Is the 'Pair Up and Become Family' program designed to monitor ethnic minorities in Xinjiang?
Hong Kong Free Press, Uyghur genocide report ‘deeply disturbing,’ says UN
New Language of the United Front [统战新语], 结对认亲、守望相助!两年了,新疆民族团结史册翻开崭新一页![Absolutely become a family, watch and help! Two years have passed, and a new page has been opened in the history of ethnic unity in Xinjiang!]
New York Times, U.K. Won’t Send Top Officials to Beijing Winter Olympics
New York Times, ‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims
SupChina, French soccer and NBA stars speak out against Uyghur plight
SupChina, Uyghur love in a time of interethnic marriage
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act
Uyghur Tribunal, WITNESS AFTER WITNESS, HUNDREDS REVEAL THE ATROCITIES OF CHINA’S CONCENTRATION CAMPS
Xinjiang Daily, 团结一家亲 共话家国情——新疆各族干部群众欢庆佳节 [Unite as a family and talk about the national situation - The cadres and masses of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang celebrate the festive season]
Xinjiang Daily, 心贴心情相融 我们永远是一家人 [Heart to heart, we will always be one family]