1 kid, 2 kids, 3 kids, none? China's modern family problem
The Chinese government has finally recognised the need to drastically revamp family planning policies. But as attitudes towards having children have shifted, is it too little too late?
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At the end of May, the Chinese government announced a major revision to its family planning policy that would allow families to legally have up to three children. The aim of the change is to raise China’s fertility rate, and create a ‘birth-friendly society’ in which families feel supported and rewarded for having more children, and educational resources and childcare facilities are made equally accessible to all.
This policy announcement comes shortly after the release of China’s once-in-a-decade census, which revealed that the country is ageing faster than previously thought, that birth rates have declined 20% since 2019, and that its fertility rate is now the same as Japan’s at 1.3 children per woman. Of course, the census wasn’t all bad news. Chinese people are living longer, healthier lives, and are generally better educated and more prosperous.
But one thing demographers can’t ignore is the long-term impact of China’s falling fertility rate, which is seen by many as a direct result of the one child policy introduced over 40 years ago. As the population ages and more people move out of the workforce with fewer replacements, the pressure on pensions, production, and consumption will mount. Instead of being able to focus on developing new technology or improving infrastructure, the government may have to switch its focus to social care as they worry more about “whether China will grow old before it grows rich.”
It’s likely the Chinese government has had their eye on these numbers for a while, and have been at least considering a change in policy since the last amendment in 2016. Instead of letting go entirely, however, they’ve gone for a title change, a bit like Prince: the policy formerly known as the one child policy. This begs the question, if you know demographic problems are on the horizon, why bother to keep controlling things at all? Why not just let go of the reins, and let people do as they please with their bodies?
To answer this question, we must first cover the basics of family planning laws in China. Why was the one child policy introduced in the first place? Was it ever a workable idea, or the case of good intentions paving the road to serious social and economic problems down the line? And, probably the most pressing question right now, is there any coming back from the impact of the family planning policy, or are new measures just too little too late?
Right place, right time?
The initial one child policy was introduced nationwide in 1979, and remained in place relatively unaltered until 2016. At the time, there were seemingly many good reasons for its implementation. The Great Famine was still in living memory (it would be the equivalent of there being a famine that wiped out around 5% of the UK in 2001), and the country was only just getting back on its feet after the massive disruption of the Cultural Revolution. The policy also coincided with the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s new economic policies, which promoted technological and capitalist modes of production over the socialist ideals of ‘man over nature’ China had adopted in the past.
This policy didn’t just come out of nowhere, however. Even Mao — a great believer in the ability of manpower to overcome material limitations — admitted by the 1960s that family planning measures in densely populated areas would be beneficial for managing state resources. This was a reflection of the popularity of neo-Malthusian thinking at the time in both the East and West, which stated that increasing population growth would cause a strain on resources that would naturally lead to disaster.
Campaigns were launched encouraging people to marry late as early as the 1960s, and other campaigns that asked families to carry out voluntary family planning measures were promoted throughout the 1970s. They used slogans such as “One child isn’t too few, two are just fine, and three are too many,” and “Later, Longer, and Fewer” which referred to later marriage, longer gaps between having children, and fewer children in general. The campaigns were a success: “China’s overall fertility rate declined by half between 1971 and 1978.”
These campaigns eventually evolved into the one child policy. The policy was enforced with varying strictness and efficacy across the country, mainly due to the variations in population density, lifestyle, and actual fertility rates before the introduction of the policy. Birth rates were much higher in the western parts of the country, for example, and so new laws constituted a huge change in culture and social practices. Most propaganda targeted urban families. In places where there were large ethnic minority populations, or most people were rural agricultural workers — who had a genuine need for larger families — many women were able to get away with having two children, especially if the first was a girl.
Generally speaking, there was a lack of effectiveness or enforcement in the countryside, where a pressure on resources like housing or commodities was not felt as much. Rural residents also relied less on the state for benefits, and could not afford to pay fines even when imposed, meaning punishments for having two children often had no effect. Besides, fines were often seen as a small price to pay in a culture where having children — and particularly male children — is seen as an important step for securing one’s own future and comfort in old age. Many people were happy to pay fines as a sort of investment.
The road to demographic hell...
Of course, we can’t talk about the one child policy without talking about the long-term effects that have come about as a result of its introduction. Potential problems with the policy were identified as early as 1985. Apart from its effect on the country’s age structure, worries about only children being spoiled, and gender inequality caused by sex-selection, it was also pointed out that “the one-child policy may tear the fabric of Chinese society in a way that uproots people's sense of their place in the world; undermines the family's ability to take care of the old;” and would place a strain on cultural institutions such as patrilineal inheritance that could cause the breakdown of ancestral descent lines altogether.
Without the one child policy, it is possible that China’s population could have reached 2.4 billion by 2050. This is obviously way too many people. But the prescient nature of these predictions cannot be overlooked. The government now needs to think about who is going to pay for all the state pensions necessary to support the older population if the number of retirees outweighs the working population by a significant margin. There’s also the problem of who is going to work in general - who will do the physical caring for the elderly? Will automation be able to replace enough workers in time?
The social problems are in some ways worse than the economic ones. In Chinese culture, where elderly parents have traditionally relied on the eldest son to provide for them in their old age, filial piety remains a strong characteristic of society as a whole. A 4-2-1 (four grandparents, two parents and one child) family structure has emerged as the norm, putting more pressure on the one child to provide for both parents and grandparents, who are living longer lives.
The psychological need to provide care for older generations has led to increasing pressure on the one child to generally do better and succeed academically and in their careers. The Gaokao, China’s yearly university entrance exam, has become a breeding ground for unhealthy competition, and the Chinese are some of the most overworked people in the world.
The pressure isn’t just on the kids themselves. There is a huge emotional toll to bear for parents who have lost their only child and were either too old to try again or were dissuaded to do so by the state. Known as shidu, their stories are often harrowing and heartbreaking. With many of them now reaching old age without children or grandchildren, many have a sense of hopelessness and sorrow that cannot be filled by government compensation. Essentially, the policy has left them feeling alienated and resentful, and one can hardly blame them.
Then there’s the obvious problem of gender disparity. The natural sex ratio at birth (SRB) of boys to girls should be around 1.05. Due to sex-selective abortions, the SRB in China peaked at 1.21 nationally in 2005, and in some areas was as high as 1.40. Essentially, the number of young Chinese men exceeds the number of young Chinese women by around 13%. As these generations come of age, such a drastic imbalance in sex ratios could lead to dire social problems such as higher male suicide rates and an increase in terrorism, not to mention a lack of wives for poorer, rural men in particular, causing further downward pressure on China’s population.
Wrong, but not too wrong
In 2013, the government amended the one child policy allowing couples who are only-children to have two children. In 2016, a universal two child policy was adopted, causing a temporary boost in birth rates as women who had only recently had their first child took advantage of the opportunity to have a second. The change also led to a decline in the SRB back to normal levels, helped along by other policies such as the abolition of sex-selective abortions and the increased opportunities for women in education and work. However, the uptick in birth rate failed to meet expectations, and in some places fertility even declined. Now, just 5 years later, the government has changed their policy once again.
Is this change in policy an admittance of wrong or even guilt on the part of the party? Not necessarily. The government hasn’t actually said anything about the old policies, let alone hinted that they may have been misguided. Acknowledgments that the state has to do something about the ageing population but that “population aging is a dominant demographic phenomenon around the globe and China is no exception” are kind of like the party’s admittance in the wake of the Great Leap Forward that 70% of the famine was man-made, while 30% was caused by nature. Don’t expect a confession or full-blown apology any time soon.
Also, to the CCP’s credit, not everything that came out of the one child policy was negative. Generally speaking restricting reproduction led to greater levels of higher education attainment, more high-level job creation, higher incomes and savings, and improvements in gender equality and female rights. While China is still a developing country and has a long way to go in many of these aspects, studies have shown that the one child policy did at least give Chinese people the opportunity to get ahead of other developing nations that little bit quicker.
So now that China’s wealth has risen and the country’s importance in global trade and politics is all but assured, why not just let go? The short answer is that the Chinese government is not willing to let people do whatever they want. They’re not just mindlessly addicted to power - it’s basically all they know. The need to dictate both the economic and social aspects of people’s lives through migration policies such as hukou or surveillance systems such as the Social Credit system are seen as a necessary and practical part of the state apparatus, not an abuse of power.
Also, it’s likely that the state feels the need to play a more active role in family planning generally, as attitudes towards child bearing and rearing have changed so drastically over the past 4 decades. Monitoring of social media platforms bars skepticism towards the new policy online in China, but private discussions and interviews reveal true sentiments around how it’s expensive to have 1 or 2 kids, let alone 3. The reality for most couples is that they have a better shot at becoming affluent themselves - and therefore providing a better life for their child - if they only have one. And we haven’t even spoken about the people who don’t want kids in the first place.
Dinks and divorce
Developments in gender equality, growth of national and personal wealth, and rise in living costs have engendered new attitudes towards having kids in China. More and more people don’t want any children at all, including married couples. Known as DINKs (double income, no kids), they worry about the ever rising costs of having children (an estimated $156k USD for urban residents), have concerns regarding their ability to look after them properly, and in general seek greater freedom, especially women with higher levels of education and a more developed sense of independence.
Even if these couples do give in to the pressure of having children, their relationship with them may be very different to traditional family relationships of the past. Those who don’t see children as a necessary part of their lives are willing to have one just to give to their own parents to raise, usually to shut them up. This temporary solution to the contradiction between traditional views and modern living may well backfire in these sub-DINK couple’s faces, however, once their parents pass away and they’re left with a child they never wanted. The long-term psychological effects on their children will no doubt be the topic of intense study in 10-15 years.
This pressure to have children regardless of desire is seemingly already having unforeseen consequences. As a recent divorce case in Jiangsu revealed, even the nature of custody battles have been transformed as both parents tried to fob the kid off on the other, citing expenses and work commitments. In the end, the judge decided to deny their divorce altogether until they could come up with a workable arrangement. I’m sure their daughter feels very loved, and her future therapy bills will be very manageable.
Peak authoritarianism
What’s the best path for the Chinese government? They can’t undo what’s already been done, and the evidence shows that other countries that have tried to boost birthrates have failed. At the end of the day, as China grows richer, the cost of living goes up, and the benefits of having one child over many remain desirable, the fertility rate will likely continue to fall. But if this continues to be a problem for the state, you’d better believe that they will take steps to fix it. The reality is that whatever the government decides to do, it’s not likely to be a pleasant or friendly experience for the Chinese people.
An important element of China’s family planning policies that mustn't be forgotten is that they are a reflection of the coercive nature of an authoritarian state. During the period 1979-2015, women were not just discouraged from having children, but were fined, sterilised, or forced to abort if they did not comply with the rules. In some places, couples had to apply for certificates before trying to conceive, and women could be forced to take regular pregnancy tests or be punished for simply not using contraception. While some officials could be bribed or were more lenient, as with other ‘socialist building’ policies in China, the most ardent cadres were determined to meet their quotas and were therefore willing to be brutal in the policy’s implementation.
Also, the state cannot simply admit that its initial policy was ‘wrong’ or ‘misguided’ or ‘too harsh’. This is also the reason why family planning policies cannot be abandoned altogether. To admit that these sorts of policies are overly coercive, invasive, or just unnecessary could undermine the entire regime and its modus operandi. Further, while these policies are a problem in and of themselves, they also create a sort of ripple effect whereby other (increasingly) authoritarian regimes with high populations (India) can legitimately consider adopting similar policies.
In a comment to the BBC, Amnesty International China team head, Joshua Rosenzweig stated that "Governments have no business regulating how many children people have. Rather than 'optimising' its birth policy, China should instead respect people's life choices and end any invasive and punitive controls over people's family planning decisions.”
To this I say, lol. Of course, he’s not wrong. People want control over their reproductive future, and women in China have expressed their desire for a greater voice in society, as seen by the country’s fledgling #MeToo movement. But, while solutions such as improving equality in the workplace so women feel secure having kids and working may seem obvious, the idea of letting go of control over any aspect of the social lives of the people is anathema to the CCP. They tried that discussion in 1989. It did not end well.
So the CCP will continue to take a hands-on approach to population control. However, they need to tread carefully. If they become too used to relying on increasing authoritarianism to tweak fertility, there’s no reason why we could not see the introduction of a completely opposite policy in the future. It’s not too difficult to imagine a mandate that sets a minimum number of children per woman as opposed to a limit. That could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back.
Special thanks to Charlie Q for suggesting this topic!
Sources
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Cato Institute, Neo‐Malthusianism and Coercive Population Control in China and India: Overpopulation Concerns Often Result in Coercion
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