Book Review: The Logic of Governance in China by Xueguang Zhou, 2022
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Book Review: The Logic of Governance in China by Xueguang Zhou
Genre: Political Sociology, Politics and Policy, China Studies
General rating: 3.5/5
Accessibility rating: 1/5
Study/research rating: 4/5
Recommended for: Master’s and PhD students who need an updated guide on local governance, policy implementation and political theory in China.
“This research experience offers me a bottom-up perspective to examine larger issues about interactions between policy making and implementation; between the central and local governments; and among state policies, local officials, and grassroots society, and ultimately the logic of governance in China.”
Based on research carried out in a north China agricultural township between 2004 and 2015, Xueguang Zhou’s work uses observations of local cadres carrying out their daily duties, as well as other research on government behaviours in other areas, and creates a new analytical framework to make sense of the institutional logic of governance of China and update general knowledge about how China is being governed.
Originally published in Chinese in 2017, it combines theory and practical fieldwork to make sense of seemingly disparate and contradictory elements of the Chinese bureaucracy. It aims to answer the questions: Are there some common, stable mechanisms and processes that underpin and interconnect the logic that governs China? What is the institutional logic of China and what developments in Chinese history led to its rise? And, how can an examination of the tensions between central and local government reveal more about the tensions between policy formulation and policy implementation?
This book review aims to assess whether or not the book achieves its stated goal, as well as whether or not it’s worth reading yourself. Let’s dive into it!
Intro
In the introduction, the author lays out that the general governance of China varies greatly from region to region. Locally you have issues of “selective implementation, deviation, and collusion among local officials”, as each region has its own levels of economic development, its own relationship with central government, and its own particular struggles and issues. In this sense “governance refers to those patterned practices in the exercise of authority organized by and around the Chinese state.”
Zhou starts by outlining the tension between the central government, which is responsible for setting the course of the country by dictating policy, and local governments and officials, who are responsible for implementing policies. He argues that in order for the government to function, there are four main responses to this tension:
Variable-coupling: the relationship between centre and local will sometimes be tight and controlling, and sometimes be loose and flexible depending on political pressures
The side by side existence of both formal and informal institutions
The role of political rhetoric and ideological education in local symbolic compliance with centre, particularly officials’ seeming receptiveness towards directives and their ability to link their achievements to top-down initiatives
Top-down mobilisation campaigns as a political weapon for the central authority to reassert its authority, in which “it is commonly observed that, in the process of political campaigns, both the choice of targets and the penalties imposed are often selected arbitrarily, with the aim of deterring others rather than seeking to resolve these so-called bureaucratic problems.”
Zhou also points out the fact that territorial and population size of China is an important factor in governance analysis, especially in comparative analysis, which a lot of scholars overlook. One can’t compare China directly to Singapore for example, as it’s more like Europe in size and population. The mode of governance should also be considered, for example whether the system is federal or centralised. The fact that the centralised power of China’s supreme leaders gives it direct control over resource allocation and personnel management is crucial in his analysis, which uses a Weberian framework to define China’s politics. Within this framework, China’s party-state emerges as a mix of both charismatic and rational-legal authority. While both are important bases of legitimacy for the state, the rational-legal aspect can never become dominant as it would undermine the charismatic leadership that the party has spent decades cultivating.
Part 1
The first part of the book covers the way in which the variable-coupling relationship between central government and local bureaucracy operates and is manipulated by various actors. He argues that since the beginning of the Chinese state in 221BC, there has always been a tension between the ruler (usually an emperor, later a charismatic politician) and the bureaucracy that carries out their rule. The bureaucracy both supports the regime - giving it legitimacy by providing an organisational link with the masses and by propagating the ideology of the party-state - and derives its own authority from the delegation of power by the same state it serves. But the bureaucracy is a constraining factor on the arbitrary power of the state, which is why the charismatic central authority has to enact mobilisation campaigns to regain full control over all areas of Chinese life.
“The emperor’s power had to be exercised through the bureaucrats, and tensions were built into the organizational apparatus interlocking the two. On the one hand, bureaucratic power was based on a top-down process of delegation; on the other hand, the bureaucracy had its own internal mechanisms and routines that tended to buffer external interventions. In this sense, the emperor’s power met with resistance from the entire bureaucracy.”
The relationship between three different levels of governance (centre, provincial, and local municipal/county) is formulated as a ‘principal - supervisor - agent’ triad. The process of decision-making is top-down and all ideas come from the centre, the principal. However, they rely on the provincial governments to supervise their implementation, and the compliance of the local county governments to do the actual implementation. This also requires some negotiation between the provincial and local governments, where goal posts may be moved backwards or forwards to make the work achieved seem more impressive and make it easier for local leadership to achieve their goals and receive rewards. Incentivisation and punishment is left up to supervisors, but overall evaluation is still in the hands of the principal, the central authority.
Campaign-style mobilisation used to readjust the strength of the centre’s hold over the local governments and bureaucratic officials. These campaigns sometimes serve to strengthen centralisation like during the Cultural Revolution, and at other times serve to free up local power like in the ‘Reform and Opening up’ era. In this way, mass mobilisation campaigns are not an aberration or defect of the system, but an important part of it. Disruption by the centre is built into the everyday apparatus of the party-state bureaucracy, acting as a corrective and a reminder of the overarching power and arbitrariness of the supreme leadership of the party.
Part 2
The second part of the book deals with the relationship between the centre and local more directly, and seeks to answer the following questions: What are the key processes or forms of bureaucratic bargaining? What are the patterns of interaction among bureaus and offices in the bargaining process? What factors contribute to the bargaining power of each side?
Zhou answers these questions using his own theoretical frameworks as well as field research conducted in a municipal environmental protection bureau (MEPB) in northern China between 2008 and 2010. This bargaining can take on a formal or informal nature depending on whether the ‘agent’ county body wants the process to be open and recorded, or they would prefer some sort of preferential treatment based on interpersonal relationships. A third option is a ‘quasi-exit’ from the bargaining game, i.e. when all else fails, just don’t comply, or find ways to circumvent enforcement and inspection. The collusion between different parties is a result of the tension between local and central governance, the fact that top-down formulated policies require flexible implementation, cooperation between provincial, municipal and county levels, and a certain amount of ‘turning a bling eye’. This often means that instead of effective implementation, local governments concentrate more on distorting results or evading error detection.
“Collusion takes place on the stable basis of authority relationships among supervising–subordinating agencies, and it is reinforced by formal government institutions. When the immediate supervising government demands that its subordinate governments participate in collusion (e.g., by providing inflated statistics to create the semblance of achievements in governance, or to cover up bad decisions), it is impossible for the subordinate governments to refuse to participate.
Similarly, when the subordinate agencies plead for help through collusion, the supervising government has an incentive to participate… Finally, and more importantly, in the Chinese bureaucracy it is often difficult to distinguish between collusive behavior and reasonable flexibility in the actual process of policy implementation…”
Chinese bureaucrats also often are forced to simply ‘muddle-through’ due to high levels of pressure, limited information, and resource constraints. They often move incrementally and reactively to meet targets as they don’t know what the outcome of their decisions will be.
“My central argument is that in the face of the pressures generated by competing bureaucratic logics, local bureaucrats adopt improvised strategies, make constant readjustments, and focus on short-term gains rather than exhibiting a course of consistent, anticipatory actions.”
Part 3
The last three chapters of the book examine the interactions between state and society as mediated by local government by looking at three different cases: public goods provision for a road pavement project in two villages; village elections in a township; and collective action based on unorganised interests on the national scene. They give a more practical, on-the-ground explanation of how the relationship between local and central government affects the lives of ordinary Chinese citizens.
This section is the most interesting from a purely reading perspective, as it has a narrative arc that features all the quirks of typical China stories: underdevelopment, disinterested villagers, state coercion, shady debt-financing, guanxi (social network of mutually beneficial personal and business relationships), and personal struggle against forces far greater than the self. In the end, the local government seems to only have itself to rely on, and bears all the consequences of its decisions to comply fully, partially, or not at all with state dictates.
“I witnessed a scene in which a township official in charge of implementing the PREV project openly coached Mr. Long: “Don’t tell them [the suppliers of the materials] that you do not have the money. Just say that they will get paid when the project is completed. After all, lying and cheating are not punished by the death penalty.”
Is it worth reading?
We need an update on Chinese political theory and modes of governance every few years, and this book is a welcome addition to the body of literature. It was particularly helpful for me, as someone who writes about China, to get updates and reminders about how politics and policy really works on the ground.
The book is very theoretical and technical, and for this reason is not intended for the casual reader. Unless you’re undertaking a research project about central and local governance, you don’t need to bother with this one. The language is quite esoteric, and it assumes a lot of knowledge (for example, the distinction between party and government is never made, the author assumes you know all of that already).
Apart from being written in rambling, academic prose, the book covers a lot of well-trodden ground. There’s not a lot of new information per se, but that’s not to say that the information is of no use. The fieldwork examples would make good references for an article or thesis, and the theoretical frameworks provide accessible models for researchers looking for quick and easy ways to describe how China’s everyday politics works. It’s a little longer than it probably needs to be, but such is the way for these kinds of works.
I would love to see more book reviews!